Countries almost always claim high motivations: religion, ideology, morality. They strive and — if necessary — they fight for these ideals. Off-camera, however, diplomats, scholars of international relations, and other sophisticated observers roll their eyes. Countries don’t genuinely care about these childish ideals. Their true motivation is hard-boiled national self-interest. Like it or not, what rules international affairs is Realpolitik.
Or does it? At least since the dawn of mass media in the late 19th century, I see little sign that “national self-interest” explains much of anything. Realpolitik is far less predictive than its antithesis of Idealpolitik.
To grasp my point, imagine trying to explain today’s most-talked-about global conflicts to a Martian.
Israel-Palestine. While you could say, “They’re fighting over land,” this raises far more questions than it answers. Why fight at all, the Martian might ask, when one side could just buy the other out, settling the conflict once and for all? You could insist “War is haggling by other means,” but the cumulative financial cost of seventy five years of war far exceeds the actual value of the land. Stranger still, Israel has a massive military advantage, so why didn’t it seize all of the Palestinians’ land long ago? And why didn’t the Palestinians, in turn, see the writing on the wall and meekly surrender?
Idealpolitik has the answers. Israelis and Palestinians aren’t just fighting over land; they fighting over land that both sides see as “sacred.” Religiously sacred. Historical sacred. Due to the land’s sacrosanct character, most people on both sides think “selling out” is a sin. The flip side is that fighting for possession of this sacred land is a an act of religious and historical heroism. Financial cost be damned!
Why then, the Martian might ask, haven’t the Israelis just utterly crushed the Palestinians? Because the Israelis also have a conflicting set of ideals against genocide or anything close. So while they have the might for final victory, they pull their punches. A lot. Yes, you could add, “If the Israelis tried genocide, they’d face the wrath of the West and the Muslim world.” But that wrath, too, is driven by Idealpolitik — Western support for universal human rights plus global Muslim solidarity.
Russia-Ukraine. Again, you could declare, “They’re fighting over land” or “They’re fighting over whether Ukraine has to stay in Russia’s sphere of influence.” Why, though, doesn’t one just buy the other out? Why spend more fighting than the land itself is worth? The Russians claim that Ukraine’s friendship with the West poses an “existential threat,” but if the Martian asked, “How, exactly?” it’s hard to see how they’d even begin to respond.
Idealpolitik, in contrast, zeroes in on rival nationalisms. The Russians feel entitled to protect and rule all Russians — and consider many, most, or even all Ukrainians to be Russian. Most Ukrainians, in contrast, see themselves as a distinct — and aggrieved — rival nation. The Russians, moreover, tend to define the West as “their enemy,” so they fear a world where Ukraine joins the Western camp. But it is Russian ideals that drive this definition. Before the war, they could just as easily have defined the West as “their friend,” placated a few Western scruples, and ended the Ukraine conflict before it started.
U.S.-China. These two superpowers aren’t even fighting over land; they’re fighting about a hypothetical future fight over land. Given their high volume of trade, you’d expect both sides to say “We’ve got a good thing going” and “Let’s not rock the boat.” Alas, both sides flout expectations.
How could you explain this all to a Martian? For two decades, the Americans were optimistic that Chinese development would slowly lead China toward the Americans’ cherished ideals of democracy and human rights. The Chinese, however, stuck with authoritarian nationalism. By 2010 or so, the Americans felt like their glorious ideals had been spurned, and the Chinese felt like their own glorious ideals were being disrespected. Atrocities like the Uighur internment, though materially irrelevant, amplified their mutual idealistic recriminations.
At this point, the Martian might inquire, “So Idealpolitik works because the leaders of each country are earnestly devoted to their respective ideals?” And this is where things get complicated, because the truth is that humans’ devotion to their ideals is, with rare exceptions, deeply superficial. 99%+ of people who say they’re “ready to die” for religion, ideology, or morality are deceivers or self-deceivers. And thank goodness for that, because virtually all popular “ideals” range from confused to monstrous.
Still, in any polity dominated by idealistic rhetoric, the surest path to power is to mummify yourself in popular ideals. And that’s precisely what almost every political leader does. Since power-hunger is a common motive, vocal Idealpolitik hardly guarantees political success. Refusal to practice vocal Idealpolitik, however, almost guarantees political failure. Once they’ve got power, of course, leaders’ pride is on the line, too. To announce, “Our ideals are kind of stupid” is humiliating.
Realpolitik remains analytically, though not predictively, useful. In a world of real Realpolitik, countries would durably solve every major dispute with pragmatic bargaining. Even the bargaining would often be unnecessary. When reputation matters, noblesse oblige beats nickel-and-diming: See the return policies of Amazon and CostCo. In a world of Realpolitik, Israelis would just buy up Palestinian land for double its market price, and Palestinians would chirp, “Pleasure doing business with you.” In a world of Realpolitik, Russians never would have invaded Ukraine; why try to beat the West when you can join it? In a world of Realpolitik, the U.S., China, and Taiwan would drop the nonsense of strategic ambiguity. Either Taiwan would pay an exit price, or China would cultivate global good will with “Don’t worry about it, no charge.” The harsh reality that none of this will happen is strong evidence that Idealpolitik and “realism” are, far from opposites, one and the same.
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Caplan and Candor
"Why do men fight? They fight for food. And not only food. Sometimes there must be a beverage."--Woody Allen
These questions have been bothering me for a while. All the answers I come up with seem demonstrably wrong.
Realpolitik is a total nonstarter. But idealpolitik doesn’t really work either. Obviously the leadership doesn’t believe in some ideal. So are they just opportunists, doing what they think will put them ahead? It seems too monolithic for that, too group-thinky. If they were opportunistic, there would be more variety, with innovators trying to find a flavor that works better for them. I am puzzled how that ends up being unanimous stupidity. Maybe there is something lumpy about it, and people are afraid to depart too far from the dominant thinking? That might make sense, if the result wasn't embarrassing failure , after debacle, after humiliation.
I guess the only conjecture left is that opportunistic leaders are highly constrained within a narrow range of negative sum alternatives imposed on them by... popular support and defense contractor lobbyists?
But this also seems nuts. At some point, Charlie Brown has to stop trying to kick the football.